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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATWE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Centorani, David Facility: Woodbourne CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: OO-A-3031 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
10-140-18 B 
Appearances: John Ferrara Esq. 
548 Broadway 
Monticello, New York 12701 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Coppola 
who participated: · 
Papers considered: Appellant'siBriefreceived January 30, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: ·Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fonn 902.6), COMPAS instrument; Offender Case 
Plan. . 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~~~d _Vacated, 'remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Lnned Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for th_c Parole Board's determination!!!!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te fyidings. ~f 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 7, ~ /J Cf ~o . 
. . , 
Distribution: AppeaJs Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Centorani, David DIN: 00-A-3031  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  10-140-18 B 
    
Findings: (Page 1 of 3) 
 
    Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. The appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary 
and capricious in that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory 
factors, as appellant is clearly ready for release. 2) the Board ignored the COMPAS. 3) the decision 
lacks details. 4) the decision lacks future guidance. 5) the 24 month hold is excessive. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also 
considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor 
considered.  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all 
factors need not be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & 
Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
    Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the violent nature of petitioner's  offense,  
it was not required to discuss or give equal weight to every factor it considered in denying 
petitioner’s request” - Matter of Yourdon v. New York State Div. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 
820 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 801, 828 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2007). 
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     There is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering  
insight.  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000). Matter of 
Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002) 
(limited insight into why crime committed).   
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
    The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    The COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs 
as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory 
factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that 
the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors 
including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards 
that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
As such, “the Board adhered to the requirements of Executive Law § 259-c(4) in making its parole 
decision, which included consideration of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist in 
determining whether an inmate may be released to parole supervision.”  Matter of LeGeros v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016). Even uniformly 
low COMPAS scores and other evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the broader questions 
of society’s welfare, public perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether release would 
undermine respect for the law.  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and 
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declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board is not required 
to give the COMPAS and case plan greater weight than the other statutory factors.  Matter of 
Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); accord Matter of Lewis 
v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1478, 59 N.Y.S.3d 726 (3d Dept. 2017). 
    Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). Denial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
    The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be 
disturbed.   Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 
(3d Dept. 2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 
(Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
